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1. Introduction 
Expected utility theory, the theory of risky decision-making considered in mainstream 
economics, cannot accommodate the Allais (1953) paradox, a puzzle that ubiquitously 
emerges in questionnaires. Consider the two pairs of situations (described in detail in 
Section 2, Materials and Methods): A and B; along with C and D. Situation A is the 
certainty of receiving 100 million, whereas Situation B is a 10 percent chance of 
winning 500 million, an 89 percent chance of winning 100 million, and a 1 percent 
chance of winning nothing. Situation C is an 11 percent chance of winning 100 million 
and an 89 percent chance of winning nothing, whereas Situation D is a 10 percent 
chance of winning 500 million and a 90 percent chance of winning nothing. Expected 
utility theory predicts that the preference of A over B should entail the preference of C 
over D, and conversely. However, people often violate this theory. 
Allais himself explains the paradox by the expected utility theory’s neglect of 
two basic psychological features: (1) the nonidentity of monetary and psychological 
values, and (2) the distribution of utility, as a whole, about the mean, rather than the 
mathematical expectation of utility only (Allais, 2008). When very large sums are 
involved in comparison with the psychological capital of the subject, there is strong 
interdependence between the different gambles and their probabilities. Further, this 
entails a preference for security in the neighborhood of certainty. 
Preference of A over B should entail the preference of C over D, according to 
expected utility theory, as mentioned. However, expected utility theory accommodates 
competing risk preferences. The theory only requires that once preference of B over A 
occurs, for example, this should entail the preference of D over C. Although there are 
several studies relating biological variables to risk preferences (as surveyed below), 
there is none relating the Allais counterexample itself to biological characteristics. 
 Consequently, we investigate whether a subject’s biological trait makes him or her more 
prone to display the paradox. The results of studies relating biological variables to risk 
preferences suggest that the Allais paradox itself should be related to biological 
characteristics. 
We apply the variants of the Allais example used by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1979) to 120 student subjects. We also apply a presurvey questionnaire to gather 
information about a subject’s gender and age, whether they have children, their second- 
to fourth-digit ratio, current emotional state, perceived negative life events, and whether 
they believe in God. We find that particular states of these ―biocharacteristics‖ are 
related to the paradox. 
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Next, we provide a brief 
overview of the findings regarding the above biocharacteristics in relation to risk. This 
aims to justify our own selection of the characteristics in the presurvey questionnaire. 
Then, in Section 2, we explain the Allais paradox in detail and the test statistics used to 
study the same. The contents of the questionnaire (the questions responded to by the 
participants) are then described in connection with the Allais paradox, followed by the 
details of data collection from the sample subjects. Finally, we present the results 
(Section 3) and a conclusion (Section 4). 
Risk attitudes and their relation to biological characteristics 
The biological roots of decision-making under risk do matter. Now, we provide a brief 
overview of previous findings to justify this statement. Among the several studies 
relating biological variables to risk preferences, the studies on twins (Barnea et al., 
2010; Cesarini et al., 2009a; Cesarini et al.; 2009b, Zhong et al., 2009a), molecular 
genetics studies (Crisan et al., 2009; Dreber et al., 2009; Kuhnen and Chiao, 2009; 
Roiser et al., 2009; Zhong et al., 2009b; Zhong et al., 2009c), and hormonal studies 
 (including digit ratio; Chen et al., 2005; Apicella et al., 2008; Coates and Page, 2009; 
Pearson and Schipper, 2009; Sapienza et al., 2009; Zethraeus et al., 2009) are worth 
mentioning. Here, we focus on the following biocharacteristics: gender, age, 
parenthood, handedness, second- to fourth-digit ratio, current emotional state, perceived 
negative life events, and religiousness. 
Gender 
Gender differences may be important for preferences in general and risk preferences in 
particular (Croson and Gneezy, 2008). Generally, women are more risk-averse. 
Portfolios of single women are commonly less risk-oriented than those of single men. 
Female risk-aversion may arise from the fact that women are relatively more pessimistic 
and insensitive to probabilities. However, all the experimental evidence may be 
framing-dependent (Byrnes et al., 1999, present a meta-analysis of the results in 
literature). Men are also believed to be more overconfident than women (Barber and 
Odean, 2001), and this has already been related to their biocharacteristics (Zindel et al., 
2010). Because overconfidence leads to overtrading and lower returns, men appear to be 
less ―rational‖ than women in this matter (Da Costa Jr. et al., 2008). Thus, we will look 
for explicit correlations between a subject’s gender and their pattern of violation of 
expected utility theory through the Allais paradox. 
Risk preferences and menstrual cycle may be related, too (Chen et al., 2005; 
Pearson and Schipper, 2009). Thus, we also find it worthwhile to focus on the particular 
female characteristics ―ovulation‖ and ―menstruation,‖ which are related to hormonal 
changes. The onset of menstruation corresponds closely with the hormonal cycle, and 
women may experience emotional disturbances associated with menstruation. Women’s 
sexual desire also changes near ovulation, and this may interfere with their decision-
making under risk and, perhaps, with their propensity to display the Allais paradox. 
 Thus, we asked in our presurvey questionnaire whether female subjects were either 
ovulating or menstruating. These biocharacteristics were then related to the pattern of 
violation of expected utility theory in the questionnaire. (Eckel and Grossman, 2008, 
provide an excellent survey on the relationship between sex differences and risk.) 
Here, we find that gender differences and menstrual cycle do matter. In our 
experiment, men were more prone to the Allais paradox. Among the women, those who 
were menstruating at the time of the experiment were more predisposed to display the 
paradox. 
Age 
In the case of behavior, age is considered important. In particular, age is correlated with 
risk-taking (Dohmen et al., 2005). For instance, unlike adults, kids are risk-lovers 
(Moreira et al., 2010). There is not much difference between the brains of a 25-year-old 
youth and a 75-year-old person. However, in the years between the age of 10 and the 
mid-20s, hormonal factors trigger a need to impress peers by reckless behavior, and this 
generates an inability to perceive risks accurately. Moreover, an urge for ―sensation-
seeking‖ reaches a peak during the late teen years and then declines gradually 
throughout life. Those who have a greater inclination to sensation-seeking tend to have 
higher levels of testosterone than others (Campbell et al., 2010, relate sensation-seeking 
to testosterone levels and discuss previous research on this topic). Sensation seekers 
also tend to have low levels of monoamine oxidase, an enzyme that regulates serotonin, 
which in turn regulates mood. People with low monoamine oxidase levels tend to 
smoke and drink more than others and are more likely to have a criminal record. All 
these considerations allow us to conjecture that people below 25 years of age show a 
pattern of behavior related to the Allais paradox, which may be different from that of 
older subjects. 
 In particular, we also conjecture that the mother’s age at delivery affects a boy’s 
predisposition to the Allais paradox. Boys born to young mothers are at high risk of 
committing crimes in adolescence. Maternal rejection, erratic behavior on the part of 
parents, and lack of parental supervision are among the best predictors of juvenile 
delinquency. Having a teenage mother roughly doubles a boy’s propensity to commit 
crime. (Lee et al., 2008, provide an overview that delves deeper by studying the neural 
basis of the relationship between age and risk-taking.) 
In this study, we find that boys born to young mothers (a variable measured by 
taking the mother’s current age minus son’s age  25 years) were less prone to 
displaying the Allais paradox; nevertheless, we did not find any role for age per se. 
Parenthood 
Growing kids alters parental behavior (and perhaps, indirectly, one’s attitude toward 
risk) because neural and hormonal interactions are involved in nurturing babies. 
Estrogen triggers an increase in oxytocin (a hormone that promotes bonding patterns) in 
the expectant mother, which promotes maternal behavior. Prolactin also promotes care-
giving behavior and directs brain reorganization to favor maternal behavior. The live-in 
father’s oxytocin levels also increase toward the end of his partner’s pregnancy. 
Vasopressin (known as the ―monogamy hormone‖) also plays a role in the father by 
promoting brain reorganization toward paternal and family-bonding behavior. 
Vasopressin can reinforce the father’s testosterone level and induce him to protect his 
mate and child; however, it also tempers his aggression, making him less capricious. 
The father’s prolactin levels also increase after cohabitation with the child. Elevated 
prolactin levels, in both the nursing mother and the involved father, cause some 
reduction in their testosterone levels, even though they also elevate the levels of the 
pleasure hormones known as opioids. Fathers usually have lower salivary testosterone 
 levels than unmarried men and married nonfathers. (On this subject, see Storey et al., 
2000; Berg and Wynne-Edwards, 2001; Gray et al., 2002; and references therein.) 
We thus conjecture that parenthood may be related to whether a subject is more 
or less prone to violate expected utility theory. Furthermore, we find that childless 
subjects are more prone to showing the Allais paradox. 
Handedness 
Approximately 10–13 percent of any population is left-handed. However, no one knows 
the exact reason why the right-handed human population is predominant. Genetics 
certainly plays a role, but it is not the only factor causing left-handedness. For instance, 
even when both parents are left-handed, there is only a 26 percent chance of their child 
being left-handed. The proportion of left-handers has remained constant over a long 
period of 30,000 years. This suggests that there is an evolutionary role for left-handers, 
who possess a ―surprise‖ factor during combat; moreover, the forces causing left-
handedness are independent of culture. 
Left-handed people occupy the extremes when it comes to health and ability. 
Left-handed people have IQs greater than 140 in comparison to right-handed people. 
Left-handedness has also been associated with talent in music and sports. This may 
partly be because left-handers have an intrinsic neurological advantage over right-
handers. Males are three times more likely to be left-handed than females. Homosexuals 
may be up to 39 percent as likely to be left-handed as heterosexuals. Left-handedness 
has also been linked to epilepsy, Down’s syndrome, autism, and mental retardation. 
Left-handed peoples’ life spans are shorter than those of their right-handed counterparts 
by as much as 9 years, which in part may be due to the prevalence of right-handed tools 
in society: thus, left-handers are more prone to accidents. (See Llaurens et al., 2009; 
 Corballis, 1997; Raymond et al., 1996; and references therein for a full discussion of 
left-handedness.) 
All these arguments allow us to conjecture that risky choices may be made 
differently by left-handed people. Left-handers may also display a pattern of violation 
of expected utility theory distinct from that of right-handers. This study suggests that 
right-handers are more susceptible to the Allais paradox, although the result from our 
sample lacks a statistical significance. 
Second- to fourth-digit ratio 
The ratio between the lengths of the second and fourth digits is claimed to be a marker 
for prenatal testosterone exposure and may influence choice under risk. It may also be 
related to a subject’s predisposition to the Allais paradox. It is claimed that high-
testosterone men can be tracked by a relatively long ring finger. Men tend to have lower 
values of 2D:4D ( 0.98) than women ( 1), that is, men have relatively shorter index 
ﬁngers (2D) compared to ring ﬁngers (4D). Low digit ratios are caused by high prenatal 
testosterone exposure, low prenatal estrogens, or both. Low digit ratios in men are 
associated with higher sperm numbers, good health, physical aggression, enhanced 
fairness considerations, greater number of sexual partners and greater number of 
children fathered, superior athletic and musical ability, and higher levels of courtship 
behavior in the presence of potential mates. 
High testosterone levels may affect economic decisions. In ultimatum game 
experiments, low-digit-ratio high-testosterone men tend to lose their drive for a good 
deal after viewing sexy pictures, a result also replicated for salivary testosterone. 
However, whether digit ratio really correlates with risk preferences is still unsettled 
(see, for example, the results in Apicella et al., 2008), and the pattern of digit ratio 
might not be robust across ethnicities either (Pearson and Schipper, 2009). (Voracek and 
 Loibl, 2009, provide a comprehensive survey of the digit-ratio literature, and Manning, 
2002, is the key reference.) 
 Herein, we measured the lengths of the fingers on the right hands of the subjects 
with a caliper and then calculated the digit ratios. We found that men with relatively 
longer index fingers, that is, men with low prenatal testosterone exposure, are more 
likely to express the Allais paradox. 
Emotional state 
Emotions surely play a role in one’s attitude toward risk, although this is ignored by 
expected utility theory. Emotional states clearly influence financial decisions (Ackert et 
al., 2003). For instance, investors in a good mood are more risk-averse (Isen et al., 
1988), and anxiety tends to make them prone to choose gambles with low-risk payoffs. 
Fear can discourage people from taking advantageous gambles, although insufficient 
fear can produce nonmaximizing behavior in the presence of risky options of negative 
expected value. Sadness makes people prone to choose gambles of high-risk payoff. In 
contrast, anxiety tends to make people prone to choose gambles with low-risk payoffs. 
In addition, fearful people usually make pessimistic risk assessments, whereas angry 
people tend to make optimistic risk assessments (Lerner and Keltner, 2000; also refer 
the discussion of literature in Lerner and Keltner, 2001). 
 Risk-averse behavior may be governed by immediate responses to fear, which 
occur in the amygdala. The brain has evolved to make emotional and rational decisions, 
in addition to adopting controlled and automatic decisions (Camerer et al., 2005). 
Controlled and rational decisions can either cooperate or compete with automatic and 
emotional decisions. Cost-benefit analysis only makes sense for controlled and rational 
decisions, and rational decision-making depends on prior accurate emotional processing 
 (Bechara and Damasio, 2005). Emotion can be beneficial to decision-making when it is 
integral to a task; however, it can also be disruptive when unrelated to the task. 
Initially, we conjecture that emotional states are related to predisposition to the 
Allais paradox. In this study, we consider a very direct model to assess basic emotional 
states: a continuous affect scale, ranging from ―very anxious‖ and ―moderately anxious‖ 
to ―emotionless,‖ ―moderately excited,‖ and ―very excited.‖ We find that except for the 
characteristic ―very anxious,‖ all the others show a relation with the manifestation of the 
Allais paradox. In particular, in the absence of emotions such as anxiety and excitement, 
people are more inclined to show the paradox. 
We also track, as shown in Figure 1, the emotions of the subjects using the 
model of the affective circumplex (Russell, 1980)  because it arguably helps to explain 
both current research and clinical findings that are at odds with models of basic 
emotions, such as the representation described in the previous paragraph (Posner et al., 
2005). The circumplex model proposes that all affective states arise from two 
fundamental neurophysiological systems—one related to valence (a pleasure–
displeasure continuum), and the other related to arousal or alertness. Each emotion can 
be understood as a linear combination of these two dimensions or as varying degrees of 
both valence and arousal. The circumplex model is believed to complement data from 
developmental, neuroimaging, and behavioral-genetics studies of affective disorders 
(Posner et al., 2005). In this study, we find that emotions, as measured by the affective 
circumplex, also are important for the manifestation of the Allais paradox. We find that 
not aroused, not excited, unhappy, quiet, and tired people are more prone to show the 
paradox. 
We also consider the role of reported negative life events. In general, normal 
people who react more emotionally to negative life events tend to be more risk-averse 
 than average people. For some people, negative life events and depression are related. 
Women report slightly more number of negative life events than men do. Despite this 
fact, women are actually only as vulnerable to negative life events as men are; only their 
perceptions differ (Dalgard et al., 2006). We thus consider this particular biological trait 
and conjecture that negative life events not only influence one’s attitude toward risk but 
also one’s predisposition to show the Allais paradox. In our questionnaire, we asked 
subjects to report their perceived negative life events on a scale of 0–10, ranging from a 
few negative events to many. We found that the subjects reporting only few negative 
life events were more prone to manifestation of the Allais paradox. 
Religiousness 
Although it sounds odd superficially, religiousness can also be considered a biological 
trait. This is so because there is a neurological and evolutionary basis for religious 
experiences. ―Neurotheology‖ studies the human urge for religious myths from a 
neurological point of view. The facts about the biocharacteristics of theists have been 
unearthed by neurotheology. There may be a hormonal basis for theism, too. Studies 
using positron-emission tomography find a relationship between low serotonin levels 
and self-transcendence for male subjects, a personality trait covering religious behavior 
and attitudes. The serotonin system may serve as a biological basis for spiritual 
experiences and may explain why people vary greatly in spiritual zeal. The latter may 
also have a genetic basis. (Religiousness as a biological trait is discussed in the studies 
by Ramachandran et al., 1997; and Joseph, 2002.) 
Thus, it makes sense to argue that religiousness may interfere with both behavior 
and one’s attitude toward risk. We go further and conjecture that religiousness may also 
be related to the predisposition of a subject to incur in the Allais paradox. Indeed, here 
 we find that God-believers are more susceptible to the Allais paradox, although this 
result lacks statistical significance. 
The following section discusses the Allais paradox in more detail, along with the 
test statistics employed herein to track it. 
2. Materials and methods 
Allais paradox 
Consider the example given in the Introduction again. Take two pairs of lotteries: A and 
B, along with C and D. 
A B 
the certainty of receiving 100 million a 10 percent chance of winning 500 
million 
an 89 percent chance of winning 100 
million 
a 1 percent chance of winning nothing 
 
C D 
an 11 percent chance of winning 100 
million 
an 89 percent chance of winning nothing 
a 10 percent chance of winning 500 
million 
a 90 percent chance of winning nothing 
 
 
Expected utility theory predicts that preference of A over B should entail the preference 
of C over D, and conversely. However, people often violate that in questionnaires. 
Expected utility theory is consistent with both answers AC and BD. Violations 
of the theory refer to the answers AD and BC. The fact that the violations in the 
 questionnaires are mostly of the type BC, and not of the type AD, suggests that they are 
systematic (Conlisk, 1989). Here, it is useful to identify two patterns of violations of 
expected utility theory. 
 
Pattern 1. Violations comprised of the answers AD and BC. 
 
Pattern 2. Most answers are of the type BC rather than of the type AD (violations 
  are systematic). 
 
For testing Pattern 1, two groups of subjects and the test statistic d are taken into 
account (Conlisk, 1989). The two groups considered in this study refer to the binary 
forms of our biocharacteristics, for example, male versus female, subjects aged 25 and 
below versus subjects aged above 25, and so on (Table 1). 
 The test statistic d tracks the difference in the strength of Pattern 1 between two 
groups. It has approximately a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis 
that Pattern 1 is equally strong for the two groups and can be defined as 
 
 
(1 ) (1 )
1 1
I II
I I II II
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                                                                              (1)
 
 
where V (for violations) is the fraction of subjects who violate expected utility theory 
by giving the answers AD and BC, that is, 
 
 
(AD) (BC)n n
V
N
,                                                                                           (2) 
 
where (AD)n  is the number of subjects answering A and D, (BC)n  is the number of 
subjects answering B and C, and N is the sample size. The two groups are labeled I and 
 II. An improbably large positive value of d relative to the Gaussian provides evidence 
that Pattern 1 is stronger in Group I (Conlisk, 1989). (Observe that the equation (2) 
should refer separately to either Group I or Group II when calculating d using equation 
(1).) 
 Pattern 2 can be tested using the following test statistic Z (Conlisk, 1989): 
 
 
2
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where S (for systematic) is the fraction of violators who give the answer BC rather than 
AD, that is, 
 
 
(BC)
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n
S
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This test statistic Z has approximately a standard normal distribution under the null 
hypothesis that violations of expected utility theory are purely random. Positive values 
of Z indicate systematic violations, and an improbably large Z-value relative to the 
Gaussian provides evidence of Pattern 2 (Conlisk, 1989). 
We apply these tests to the data gathered in the questionnaire below and to the 
presurvey questionnaire conveying information about the biocharacteristics of the 
subjects. 
Questionnaire 
The subjects were asked the following questions, which draw on the questionnaire 
proposed by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). 
 The first two pairs of questions are as follows. 
 Question 1 
Choose between 
A B 
$2,500 with probability 33% 
$2,400 with probability 66% 
$0 with probability 1% 
$2,400 with certainty 
 
Question 2 
Choose between 
C D 
$2,500 with probability 33% 
$0 with probability 67% 
$2,400 with probability 34% 
$0 with probability 66% 
 
Kahneman and Tversky reported that most people usually choose B for Question 
1 and choose C for Question 2. Assuming that the utility ($0) 0u , the choice of B in 
Question 1 means 0.34 ($2,400) 0.33 ($2,500)u u . However, the choice of C in 
Question 2 implies the reverse inequality. This constitutes a violation of expected utility 
theory. 
The subsequent pairs of questions are 3 and 5 along with 4 and 6. These 
represent more variants of the Allais example, highlighting the choice of risky prospects 
in the domains of both gains and losses respectively. 
 
 
 
 Question 3 
Choose between 
A B 
$4,000 with probability 80% $3,000 with certainty 
 
Question 4 
Choose between 
A B 
A loss of $4,000 with probability 80% A loss of $3,000 with certainty 
 
Question 5 
Choose between 
C D 
$4,000 with probability 20% $3,000 with probability 25% 
 
Question 6 
Choose between 
C D 
A loss of $4,000 with probability 20% A loss of $3,000 with probability 25% 
 
Kahneman and Tversky observed that the majority of subjects usually choose B 
in Question 3; and C in Question 5. The choice of B in Question 3 implies that 
($3,000) ($4,000) 4 5u u , whereas the choice of C in Question 5 implies the reverse 
inequality. However, most subjects usually choose A in Question 4, and D in Question 
 6. This shows that the preference between gambles of negative outcomes is the mirror 
image of the preference between gambles of positive outcomes. 
 The next pair (Questions 7 and 8) shows a version of the Allais example for 
nonmonetary outcomes. 
Question 7 
Choose between 
A B 
A three-week tour of England, France, and 
Italy with probability 50% 
A one-week tour of England with certainty 
 
Question 8 
Choose between 
C D 
A three-week tour of England, France, and 
Italy with probability 5% 
A one-week tour of England with 
probability 10% 
 
Kahneman and Tversky noted that most subjects usually choose B in Question 7, 
but choose C in Question 8. 
 The next pair (Questions 9 and 10) refers to situations where winning is possible 
but not probable, and most people choose the gamble that offers the largest gain. The 
last pair (Questions 11 and 12) shows the mirror image for losses. 
Question 9 
Choose between 
A B 
$6,000 with probability 45% $3,000 with probability 90% 
  
Question 10 
Choose between 
C D 
$6,000 with probability 0.1% $3,000 with probability 0.2% 
 
Kahneman and Tversky’s experiment showed that the majority of subjects 
choose B in Question 9, which implies that 0.9 ($3,000) 0.45 ($6,000)u u . However, 
they choose C in Question 10, which implies the reverse inequality. 
Question 11 
Choose between 
A B 
A loss of $6,000 with probability 45% A loss of $3,000 with probability 90% 
 
Question 12 
Choose between 
C D 
A loss of $6,000 with probability 0.1% A loss of $3,000 with probability 0.2% 
 
 
In the Kahneman–Tversky questionnaire, most subjects choose A in Question 
11, which implies 0.45 ( $6,000) 0.90 ( $3,000)u u . However, they choose D in 
Question 12, which implies the reverse inequality. 
 Note that all the answers in the Kahneman–Tversky questionnaire represent 
violations of the type AD or BC. Violations of the type BC occurred for the pairs (1, 2), 
 (3, 5), (7, 8), and (9, 10), and violations of the type AD occurred for losses, that is, for 
the pairs (4, 6) and (11, 12), as the mirror image. 
Next, we present our own experiment related to such pairs of questions. 
Moreover, we investigate how the biological characteristics of the subjects may be 
related to violations of expected utility theory. 
Data 
These questions were distributed to 120 genetically unrelated subjects (62 males and 58 
females) studying in the Federal University of Santa Catarina, Brazil. These students 
were from the streams of economics, accounting, production engineering, and library 
science. The column ―number of subjects‖ in Table 2 shows the valid number of 
answers to each pair of questions. The presurvey questionnaire asking for the 
respondents’ biocharacteristics preceded the questionnaires. Table 1 shows the 
description of the groups for every biocharacteristic. 
3. Results 
First, we investigated the occurrence of Pattern 2 in the responses given to each pair of 
questions described above; that is, we assessed whether violations of expected utility 
theory in our experiment are significantly systematic. As mentioned, systematic 
violations mean that most answers are of the type BC rather than of the type AD. 
Table 2 shows the results of the test statistic Z described by equation (3). 
Positive values of Z indicate systematic violations, and large Z-values relative to the 
Gaussian (Z > 2.00) provide evidence of Pattern 2. Table 2 shows that the Z-values (in 
bold) are large (that is, greater than 2.00) for every pair of questions. This suggests that 
the Allais paradox appears in our experiment in all the versions presented and that such 
violations of expected utility theory are systematic. 
  As for the role that the biocharacteristics of the subjects play, Table 3a shows 
the results for the test statistic d (described by equation (1)) for the pairs of questions 
that consider the subject groups presented in Table 1. The statistic d tracks the 
differences in the strength of Pattern 1 (that is, violations of expected utility theory 
expressed through the answers AD and BC) between the two groups, I and II, as defined 
in Table 1. Large positive values of d relative to the Gaussian (d > 2.00) provide 
evidence that Pattern 1 is stronger in Group I. Conversely, large negative values 
establish that Pattern 1 is stronger in Group II. Values in bold in Table 3a show the 
significant cases. Excluding the biocharacteristics ―handedness‖ and ―religiousness,‖ all 
the remaining factors are statistically significant for at least one pair of questions. 
 Table 3a shows that the subjects’ inclination to display the Allais paradox while 
choosing between risky prospects depends on the following biocharacteristics: gender, 
menstrual cycle, mother’s age at delivery, parenthood, digit ratio, perceived negative 
life events, and emotional state. (Observe that although the biocharacteristic ―age‖ is not 
significant, ―mother’s age at delivery‖ is.) Those who are more likely to show the 
paradox are (1) men subjects, (2) menstruating women, (3) boys born to young mothers, 
(4) childless subjects, (5) men with relatively longer index fingers, that is, with low 
prenatal testosterone exposure, (6) subjects who reported few negative life events, and 
(7) subjects reporting an emotional state of lack of anxiety, excitement, or arousal, in 
addition to those who were unhappy, quiet, and tired. 
 Using the covariates in Table 1, we also ran a logistic regression for each pair of 
questions to ensure robustness. Here, the response variable assumes the value one for 
the answers AD and BC, and the value zero, otherwise. Only the covariates shared by 
both sexes were considered; thus, we dropped menstrual cycle, mother’s age at delivery, 
and digit ratio. We did not consider the sexes separately because this procedure would 
 render the sample size smaller and thus insufficient. The covariates were selected by the 
stepwise method. Table 3b shows the coefficients estimated by maximum likelihood. 
Values in parentheses are the corresponding p-values based on the Wald chi-square 
statistics. Values in square brackets are the associated odds ratios. An odds ratio > 1 
means a greater probability of violation of expected utility. The results show the 
contribution of a covariate for the probability of violation through either answer AD or 
BC. As can be seen, they are in accordance with the results in Table 3a, which considers 
the statistic d. 
Table 4a shows the answers given by the groups for the pairs of questions where 
a biocharacteristic presents a significant statistic d in Table 3a. As observed, evidence of 
the Allais paradox is given by the answers AD and BC. Positive (negative) d values are 
related to Group I (Group II). Violation of expected utility theory through the answer 
BC is the commonest for most biocharacteristics (that is, violations are systematic), 
except for ―menstrual cycle.‖ Also note that d is significant for both types of answers 
AD and BC for the pairs that are mirror images for losses, that is, the pairs (4, 6) and 
(11, 12). Moreover, Table 4b shows that the results using simple logistic regressions are 
in accordance with those using the statistic d. 
Table 5a shows the answers given by the subjects with reference to their 
handedness and religiousness. Although the statistic d is not statistically significant in 
both cases (d < 2.00), there is a clear tendency for the subjects to give the answers AD 
and BC, the answer BC being the commonest (that is, violations of expected utility are 
systematic). (Intriguingly, no left-hander gave the answer AD.) The positive d values in 
Table 5a are related to Group I, that is, right-handers and theists (Table 1). Thus, left-
handers and atheists are less prone to display the Allais paradox. In our sample, 21 
percent was constituted by atheists, and left-handers comprised 9.2 percent. We 
 speculate that a sample greater than 231 subjects will confirm the pattern shown in 
Table 5a, with a d value > 2.00. Furthermore, Table 5b shows that the results using 
logistic regressions are consistent with those using the statistic d. Similar to the statistic 
d, the estimated coefficients were not statistically significant in both cases. However, in 
both cases, there is a clear tendency for the subjects to give the answers AD and BC, the 
answer BC being the norm. 
4. Conclusion 
We replicated the Allais example in relation to the choice of alternative prospects in a 
sample of 120 student subjects. In addition, we show that the following 
biocharacteristics are closely related to the propensity of a subject to display the Allais 
paradox: gender, menstrual cycle, mother’s age at delivery, parenthood, digit ratio, 
perceived negative life events, and emotional state. The Allais paradox is more probable 
in (1) men subjects, (2) menstruating women, (3) boys born to young mothers, (4) 
childless subjects, (5) men with low prenatal testosterone exposure, (6) subjects who 
reported having experienced few negative life events, and (7) subjects reporting an 
emotional state lacking anxiety, emotion, excitement, and arousal, in addition to those 
who were unhappy, quiet, and tired. 
Right-handers and theists seemed to be more susceptible to the Allais paradox, 
although this result was not statistically significant. However, we speculate that a larger 
sample will replicate this finding. 
 In other words, our study suggests that women, particularly when not 
menstruating, are more ―rational‖ in that they are less susceptible to the Allais paradox. 
Those born to not-too-young mothers and men who have fathered kids are more 
rational. Those with high prenatal testosterone exposure and with many negative life 
 events are also more rational. Anxious, excited, alert, happy, active, and fresh people 
are also more rational, in addition to left-handers and atheists. 
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Figure 1. Affective circumplex: a graphical representation of the circumplex model of 
affect, with the horizontal axis representing the valence dimension and the vertical axis 
representing the arousal or activation dimension. 
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 Table 1. Group description for every biocharacteristic 
 
Biocharacteristic Group I Group II 
   
gender female male 
menstrual cycle menstruating otherwise 
age age < 25 age ≥ 25 
mother’s age (mother’s age – boy’s age) ≤ 25 otherwise 
marital status single otherwise 
parenthood having children otherwise 
handedness right-hander left-hander 
digit ratio male with digit ratio 2D:4D < 1 otherwise 
negative life events few (≤ 5) many (> 5) 
emotional state 1 very anxious otherwise 
emotional state 2 moderately anxious otherwise 
emotional state 3 emotionless otherwise 
emotional state 4 moderately excited otherwise 
emotional state 5 very excited otherwise 
affective circumplex 1 aroused, excited. or happy otherwise 
affective circumplex 2 quiet or tired otherwise 
religiousness theist atheist 
 
 
Table 2. Systematic violations of expected utility theory in every pair of questions 
 
Pair of 
questions 
Systematic 
violations 
Nonsystematic 
violations 
Number of 
subjects 
Z-value 
(1, 2) 42 13 108 4.20 
(3, 5) 54 18 113 4.61 
(4, 6) 45 19 112 3.40 
(7, 8) 61 9 116 7.58 
(9, 10) 68 7 112 9.40 
(11, 12) 42 14 114 3.98 
Note: The test statistic Z has approximately a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis that 
violations of expected utility theory are purely random. Positive values of Z indicate systematic 
violations, and large (bold) Z-values (> 2.00) relative to the Gaussian provides evidence of Pattern 2 (that 
is, most answers are of the type BC rather than of the type AD). 
 Table 3a. Test statistic d for every pair of questions answered by the groups in Table 1 
 
Biocharacteristic Pair of questions 
(1, 2) (3, 5) (4, 6) (7, 8) (9, 10) (11, 12) 
       
gender 2.34 0.59 0.81 0.07 2.07 0.58 
menstrual cycle 0.08 0.46 2.17 0.00 0.40 0.42 
age 0.84 0.33 0.36 0.48 0.34 0.53 
mother’s age 0.62 2.07 0.90 1.08 0.04 1.01 
marital status 0.35 1.93 1.77 0.48 2.52 0.35 
parenthood 0.67 0.91 1.14 0.63 3.21 0.67 
handedness 1.17 0.52 0.73 1.67 0.00 0.08 
digit ratio 0.16 0.51 2.03 2.25 0.81 0.50 
negative life events 0.37 2.29 1.75 0.59 1.03 0.95 
emotional state 1 0.39 0.33 1.25 0.09 0.87 0.94 
emotional state 2 1.78 0.39 0.07 0.04 0.62 2.02 
emotional state 3 0.55 1.08 0.69 1.22 1.31 4.57 
emotional state 4 2.88 0.84 1.27 0.66 0.04 1.41 
emotional state 5 0.95 0.33 0.47 2.04 1.06 1.07 
affective circumplex 1 1.16 0.32 0.83 0.17 0.03 2.31 
affective circumplex 2 0.55 0.26 0.23 0.72 0.06 2.62 
religiousness 0.85 1.47 0.54 0.36 0.75 0.87 
Note: The test statistic d tracks the difference in the strength of pattern 1 (that is, violations of expected 
utility theory through the answers AD and BC) between the two groups, I and II, as defined in Table 1. 
The statistic d has approximately a standard normal distribution under the null hypothesis that Pattern 1 is 
equally strong for the two groups. Large (bold) positive values of d relative to the Gaussian (d > 2.00) 
provide evidence that Pattern 1 is stronger in Group I. Conversely, large (bold) negative values give 
evidence that Pattern 1 is stronger in Group II. 
 Table 3b. Logistic regressions for every pair of questions answered by the groups in Table 1 
 
 Pair of questions 
(1, 2) (3, 5) (4, 6) (7, 8) (9, 10) (11, 12) 
 
Intercept 1.8378 
(0.0048) 
1.0799 
(<.0001) 
0.3438 
(0.1000) 
  2.9196 
(0.0085) 
 
Covariates 
 
gender 0.9824 
(0.0414) 
[2.671] 
     
age       
marital status     1.1429 
(0.0736) 
[0.319] 
 
parenthood     0.9885 
(<.0001) 
[2.687] 
 
handedness       
negative life events  1.1669 
(0.0193) 
[0.311] 
    
emotional state 1       
emotional state 2       
emotional state 3      2.5348 
(0.0191) 
[0.079] 
emotional state 4 1.8613 
(0.0020) 
[6.432] 
     
emotional state 5    0.5913 
(0.0083) 
[1.806] 
  
affective circumplex 1       
affective circumplex 2      0.9646 
(0.0369) 
[0.381] 
religiousness       
Note: In a logistic regression, the response variable assumes the value one for the answers AD and BC, 
and the value zero, otherwise. The covariates were selected by the stepwise method, and the coefficients 
were estimated by the maximum likelihood method. Values in parentheses are the p-values based on 
Wald chi-square statistics, and values in square brackets are the odds ratios. An odds ratio > 1 means a 
greater probability of violation of expected utility. ― ‖ denotes that a covariate did not enter the model. 
The results, which show the contribution of a covariate for the probability of violation through either the 
answer AD or BC, are in accordance with those using the statistic d (Table 3b). 
 Table 4a. Answers given by the two groups for the pairs of questions where a biocharacteristic presents a 
significant statistic d in Table 3a 
 
Biocharacteristic Pair of questions Statistic d Group Answer given, % 
BC AD BD AC 
        
gender (1, 2) 2.34 I 26.5 12.2 53.1 8.2 
II 49.2 11.9 20.3 18.6 
(9, 10) 2.07 I 51.0 5.9 27.4 15.7 
II 68.9 6.6 18.0 6.5 
menstrual cycle (4, 6) 2.17 I 40.0 40.0 10.0 10.0 
II 29.3 17.0 22.0 31.7 
mother’s age (3, 5) 2.07 I 40.9 4.5 27.3 27.3 
II 51.9 22.2 7.4 18.5 
marital status (9, 10) 2.52 I 65.0 6.0 20.0 9.0 
II 25.0 8.3 41.7 25.0 
parenthood (9, 10) 3.21 I 11.1 11.1 44.4 33.4 
II 65.7 5.9 20.6 7.8 
digit ratio (4, 6) 2.03 I 38.7 9.7 25.8 25.8 
II 56.7 16.7 10.0 16.6 
(7, 8) 2.25 I 40.0 6.7 36.7 16.6 
II 67.7 6.5 16.1 9.7 
negative life events (3, 5) 2.29 I 53.8 18.0 11.5 16.7 
II 34.6 11.5 30.8 23.1 
emotional state 2 (11, 12) 2.02 I 30.4 6.5 30.5 32.6 
II 40.6 15.6 29.7 14.1 
emotional state 3 (11, 12) 4.57 I 54.5 36.4 9.1 0.0 
II 34.3 9.1 32.3 24.3 
emotional state 4 (1, 2) 2.88 I 20.0 8.0 48.0 24.0 
II 44.9 14.1 29.5 11.5 
emotional state 5 (7, 8) 2.04 I 30.0 0.0 40.0 30.0 
II 53.9 8.8 28.5 8.8 
affective circumplex 1 (11, 12) 2.31 I 25.0 6.3 40.6 28.1 
II 41.5 13.0 26.0 19.5 
affective circumplex 2 (11, 12) 2.62 I 51.3 12.8 23.1 12.8 
II 28.6 10.0 34.3 27.1 
Note: Evidence of the Allais paradox is given by the answers AD and BC. Positive (negative) d values are 
related to Group I (Group II). Violation of expected utility theory by the answer BC is the commonest for 
every biocharacteristic (that is, violations are systematic), excluding ―menstrual cycle.‖ 
 Table 4b. Simple logistic regressions for the pairs of questions where a biocharacteristic presents a 
significant statistic d in Table 3a 
 
Biocharacteristic Pair of questions Statistic d Simple logistic regression 
   Estimated 
coefficient 
p-value Odds ratio 
gender (1, 2) 2.34 0.9048 0.0225 2.471 
(9, 10) 2.07 0.8443 0.0396 2.326 
menstrual cycle (4, 6) 2.17 1.5329 0.0714 0.216 
mother’s age (3, 5) 2.07 1.2321 0.0445 3.429 
marital status (9, 10) 2.52 1.5885 0.0147 0.204 
parenthood (9, 10) 3.21 2.1759 0.0089 8.810 
digit ratio (4, 6) 2.03 1.0761 0.0493 2.933 
(7, 8) 2.25 1.1896 0.0305 3.286 
negative life events (3, 5) 2.29 1.1669 0.0193 0.311 
emotional state 2 (11, 12) 2.02 0.7854 0.0473 2.193 
emotional state 3 (11, 12) 4.57 2.5667 0.0163 0.077 
emotional state 4 (1, 2) 2.88 1.3074 0.0091 3.696 
emotional state 5 (7, 8) 2.04 0.5913 0.0083 1.806 
affective circumplex 1 (11, 12) 2.31 0.9705 0.0291 2.639 
affective circumplex 2 (11, 12) 2.62 1.0451 0.0117 0.352 
Note: The results for the simple logistic regressions are in accordance with those using the statistic d 
(Table 4a). 
 
 
Table 5a. Answers given by the subjects with reference to their handedness and religiousness: Statistic d 
 
Biocharacteristic Pair of questions Statistic d Group Answer given, % 
BC AD BD AC 
        
handedness (7, 8) 1.67 I 53.8 8.5 27.3 10.4 
II 40.0 0.0 40.0 20.0 
religiousness (3, 5) 1.47 I 47.7 19.3 13.7 19.3 
II 45.8 4.2 29.2 20.8 
Note: The positive d values are related to Group I, that is, right-handers and theists (Table 1). Though the 
statistic d is not statistically significant in both cases (d < 2.00), there is a clear tendency for the subjects 
to give the answers AD and BC, the answer BC being the norm (that is, violations of expected utility 
theory are systematic). 
 
 
Table 5b. Answers given by the subjects with reference to their handedness and religiousness: Simple 
logistic regression 
 
Biocharacteristic Pair of questions Statistic d Simple logistic regression 
   Estimated 
coefficient 
p-value Odds ratio 
handedness (7, 8) 1.67 0.9062 0.1800 0.404 
religiousness (3, 5) 1.47 0.7102 0.1283 0.492 
Note: The positive d values are related to Group I, that is, right-handers and theists (Table 1). Similar to 
the statistic d, the estimated coefficients are not statistically significant in both cases; however, there is 
still a clear tendency for the subjects to give the answers AD and BC. 
 
